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1. Introduction 
Since the influential paper by Bagehot (1971), the impact of adverse selection costs in 
liquidity, trading activity, and price formation has become a fundamental notion of the 
theoretical and empirical research in market microstructure (e.g., Copeland and Galai, 1983; 
Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, and Q'Hara, 1995). Several papers have evaluated 
the relative importance of adverse selection costs over total market making costs (e.g., Stoll, 
1989; Glosten and Harris, 1988; George et aI., 1991; Lin et aI., 1995, Madhavan et aI., 1997; 
Huang and Stoll, 1997, among others). In all these studies adverse selection costs are 
characterized as the permanent impact that an unexpected trade produces on the equilibrium 
value of the stock. These papers usually build on structural models of price formation in 
which the trading process is exogenous and prices instantaneously reflect all the information 
conveyed by a trade. Moreover, structural models provide an estimator of the average adverse 
selection costs for all trades executed during the sample period studied, but are unable to 
measure the costs of each particular trade. This paper extends this line of research to a trade 
by trade dynamic framework. 
Hasbrouck (1991 a,b) suggest a general econometric approach to model the relationship 
between the trading process, endogenous in this case, and the adjustments of market quotes. 
The dynamic setting of the Hasbrouk's model enables trades to have lagged effects on market 
quotes. In this paper, we measure the information-asymmetry risk of each IBM trade executed 
at the NYSE from February to June 1996 by its estimated long-run impact on the stock price. 
This permanent impact will depend on certain observable features of the trade, like size (e.g., 
Easley and Q'Hara, 1987) and the time elapsed since the execution of the preceding trade 
(e.g., Easley and Q'Hara, 1992). The effect of price volatility and quoted liquidity are also 
considered simultaneously. The trade-specific estimator of the adverse selection costs is the 
impulse-response function of a generalization of the Hasbrouck's (1991a,b) vector 
autoregressive (V AR) model, derived by dynamic simulation. 
Using the structural model suggested by Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) we evidence that 
adverse selection costs do increase with the information-asymmetry risk estimated through 
the impUlse-response function of our model. Moreover, information-asymmetry risk is not 
uniformly distributed along the trading session, consistently with Foster and Viswanathan 
(1990, 1993) and Madhavan et al. (1997), among others. More important, we show that 
adverse selection costs estimators based on structural models of quote formation may be 
biased downward because they do not take into account the lagged effects of trades. 
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Our procedure also provides an estimation of the period of time that quotes need to adjust 
to the information carried by each particular trade. It is evidenced that quotes adjust faster 
during the opening and closing hours of the trading session. Additionally, quote alignments 
after trades are progressive rather than instantaneous; this fact originates sequences of trades 
with a similar (but decreasing) information-asymmetry risk. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and 
Holden and Subrahrnanyam (1992) suggested that the competition among informed traders 
increase price efficiency. We do show that the price discovery process improves after risky 
trades. Trading frequency augments following trades with a higher expected informational 
content, what suggests an increase in competition among informed traders. This fact 
accelerates the adjustment of the stock price to the new trade-inferred information. 
In accordance with several event studies (e.g., Lee et aI., 1993; Koski and Michaely, 2000, 
and Goldstein and Kavajecz 2000b) it is found that, during the short-term period that follows 
the execution of a given trade, the illiquidity and the trading activity levels increase with the 
estimated adverse selection costs. The sensitivity of the market conditions to our trade-
specific adverse selection costs measure indicates that observable trade and market 
characteristics signal the presence of information motivated trades and lead to the 
incorporation of the new information into prices. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the VAR model of Hasbrouck (1991a) 
and motivates the use of the impulse-response function as an estimator of the adverse 
selection costs. Section 3 describes the data and defines variables. Section 4 discusses the 
simulation procedure used to estimate the impulse-response function for each trade. Section 5 
analyzes the distribution of adverse selection costs through the trading session. Section 6 
studies the persistence in the adverse selection costs conditions. Section 7 measures the speed 
of adjustment of market quotes to the new information inferred from the trading process. 
Section 8 measures the relevance of adverse selection costs in total market making costs using 
a dynamic framework. Section 9 compares the behavior of the market after trades with 
different information-asymmetry risk. Finally, section 10 concludes. 
2. The Hasbrouck's (1991a) V AR model and the impulse-response function 
Consider the following standard model of quote formation. Let rnt be the efficient price, 
understood as the expected true value of the stock in some future terminal time le (If/I( ) 
conditional on the available public information set at moment t (<Il,), rn, == E[ lj{/<Il J This 
efficient price follows a random walk process 
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(1) 
where the innovation Wt is such that E[Wt 1 <P'_I ] = ° and E[WtWt-i 1<p,_I] = 0, V i*O. Non-zero 
values of Wt should be understood as updates of the public information set <P,. This new 
information can be inferred from the trading process or, alternatively, emanate from trade-
unrelated sources (like public announcements). Let now St be a weakly stationary stochastic 
process, that is E[st] = 0, Var[stJ = a; and E[StSt-k] = q, Vkt:.O. The variable St captures the 
transitory deviations between the efficient price and market quotes (see (2), where qt is the 
quote midpoint). This transitory component is due to market frictions, operative costs and 
inventory holding costs. 
(2) 
The stationary characterization on the transitory component guarantees that any shock 
affecting St will only have a temporal effect on quotes. On the contrary, a shock that affects to 
Wt will have a permanent impact on quotes, because it alters the expected long-run value of 
the stock (mt). As a consequence, a trade may have a permanent and a transitory impact on 
prices. Let Xt be the trade indicator, equal to 1 for a buyer-initiated trade and -1 for a seller-
initiated trade. Denote by TA = Xt - E[Xt/W-J1 to the unexpected component of a trade given the 
public information set, that can be characterized as an i.i.d. (0, ~) process. Given that the 
predictable component of Xt is already incorporated into mt-I, only TA provides new 
information to agents. Hence, the permanent impact of a trade in prices will be given by 
E[Wt/TA]' Assuming linearity, Wt = Ct.TA + Ut, with E[Ut ITA] = ° and E[UtUt-/TA] = ° V i*O. 
Therefore, 
(3) 
The parameter a>0 measures the adverse selection costs. 
Consider that the public information set in t-1 is exclusively given by the past evolution of 
trades and quotes, that is <PH = {~q'-"~'-2' ... ,X,_"X,_2' . .. }. Under this hypothesis 
Hasbrouck (1991 a,b) introduces an econometric methodology to model the dynamic 
relationship between the trading process and the adjustment of market quotes. This 
methodology is based on a general V AR model like (4), 
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D.ql = I.:I ajD.ql_1 + I.~=objxl_j + vl,1 
XI = I.:ICjD.ql_1 + I:ldjXI _j +V2,1' (4) 
The revision in market quotes D.ql = (ql - ql_l) represents the change in the midpoint of the bid-
ask spread after a trade in t (XI)' The tenns VI,I and V2,1 are zero-mean mutually and serially 
uncorrelated and homokedastic stochastic processes. The variable v 1,1 represents new trade-
unrelated infonnation. On the contrary, V2,1 is the unexpected component of the trade (TA in 
(3)). As in the previous structural model, the VAR model assumes that causality flows from 
the trading process to market quotes. Under orthogonality, COv(Vl,t, v2,d = 0, the system in (4) 
can be efficiently estimated equation by equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
The V AR methodology turns out to be more flexible than the structural models of quote 
fonnation. First, the trading process is not exogenous to the model. Second, the infonnation 
provided by a trade does not need to be incorporated instantaneously into prices. Hence, a 
trade may have lagged effects on prices. Finally, the VAR model does not require of a 
correctly specified underlying structural model; despite that, Hasbrouck (1991 a) shows that 
the V AR model captures, as special cases, the main dynamics behind those structural models 
of quote fonnation (see also Escribano and Pascual, 2000). But the VAR model has some 
important drawbacks from an econometric point of view. The homokedasticity assumption in 
the distribution of VI,I and V2,1 appears to be restrictive given the vast evidence about intraday 
detenninistic patterns in volatility (e.g., Harris, 1986; McInish and Wood, 1990a,b; Werner 
and Kleidon, 1995). In any case, defining the model in trade-time should mitigate the effect of 
a latent heterokedasticity. I In addition, Escribano and Pascual (2000) show that there is an 
important loss of infonnation in averaging the quote behavior through the quote midpoint. 
These authors propose a vector error correction model (VEC) for ask and bid prices, with the 
bid-ask spread as the error correction tenn, that generalizes the V AR model. Hasbrouck 
(1991 a,b), Hasbrouck (1993), de long et al. (1995), Hasbrouck (1996), and Dufour and Engle 
(2000), among others, discuss other controversial aspects related to the estimation of the V AR 
model, like the linearity structure and the independence between VI,I and V2,1' 
By the Wold Theorem (e.g., Hamilton, 1994) the vector {D.qt, xd, being weakly stationary 
and non-detenninistic, has a vector moving average (VMA) representation like (5), maybe of 
IHasbrouck (2000) introduces a model for ask and bid quotes in which the innovations in the efficient price are 
generated by an EGARCH model. Hausman et al. (1992) analyzes changes in prices using an ordered probit 
model, without forcing homokedasticity. However, in these models the trading process is endogenous. 
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infinite order. The (}j (L) terms, j={l , ... ,4}, are polynomials in the lag operator L (L kYt = Yt-k). 
(5) 
The polynomial ~(L) = (~,o + (}2,lL + (}2,2 L2 + .. -) represents the dynamic relationship 
between the unexpected component of a trade (V2,t) and the posterior adjustment of market 
quotes. Thus, after a unitary shock in the trading process ~2,t=l) the long-term impact on 
quotes could be measured by the sum of all the coefficients of that polynomial (see (6)). 
(6) 
The plot of al::..q'+k /av2 ,I for k={0,1,2,3 ... } is usually known as the impulse-response function. 
Hasbrouck (1991 b) suggest using the variance of (6) as an absolute measure of the 
informativeness of trades provided that I~ (l::..q, /v 2,,) is an estimator of (3). 
In this paper we use a generalization of the Hasbrouck (1991 a) model that, following 
Dufour and Engle (2000) and Escribano and Pascual (2000), is given by 
l::..q, = L:lail::..q'-i + L:o[~ + /3,"MC'_i + LA;.D/~i]X'-i +V1" 
h1'4 
X ="~ cl::..q . +"~ [rY' + rI"MC +" 'JrDh]X +v . ( .L..Ji=1 I I-I L.Ji=l '-1 I-'i /-1 L... /y, [-I /-1 2,1 
h~4 
(7) 
The vector MCt includes the set of exogenous variables that characterize the trade and its 
market environment. Vectors A" and /3/ have dimension kxl, where k is the number of 
variables in MCt, specified latter on. The vector Dt contains dummy variables that locate the 
trade inside the trading session. Therefore, the public information set is now given by 
The information-asymmetry risk associated to each trade is estimated through the impulse-
response function associated to this model. 
The results in the Melbroeck's (1992) insider trading research show that information-
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motivated trading is detected via trade-specific characteristics. Microstructure theory has 
identified several variables that may influence on the impact of a trade in prices. Easley and 
O'Hara (1987), Glosten and Harris (1988), and Hasbrouck (1988), among others, suggest that 
large-sized trades may hide impatient traders with a perishable informational advantage. The 
relevance of trade size in the V AR methodology was already evidenced by Hasbrouck 
(1991a). Easley and O'Hara (1992) propose a model in which less time between consecutive 
trades is an indicator of new information arriving at the market. Dufour and Engle (2000) test 
the predictions of Easley and O'Hara's model using the VAR methodology. Copeland and 
Galai (1983), French and Roll (1986), and Bollerslev and Melvin (1994), among others, 
manifest the relevance of price volatility in determining liquidity in general and market quotes 
in particular. In this paper volatility is introduced in the V AR model as a determinant of the 
impact of a trade in prices. It is measured by the implicit volatility in the change of market 
quotes (~qt), estimated using a GARCH-type model (e.g., Bollers1ev, 1986). Finally, adverse 
selection costs and liquidity are negatively related (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 
1985; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Kavajecz, 1999). Following the current trend (e.g., Lee et aI., 
1993; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000a,b; Jones and Lipson, 2000, and Corwin and Lipson, 
2000), in this paper liquidity is measured by both immediacy costs and depth. All these 
perfectly observable variables will be included in Afet -
3. Data 
The V AR model (7) is estimated for IBM using trade and quote data from the T AQ 
database of the NYSE. All the trading days from January to June 1996 are considered. IBM 
was one of the most frequently traded stocks during the sample period. This guarantees a 
number of observations large enough to perform the posterior empirical analysis. We only 
keep trades and quotes from the primary market (NYSE). Data from the regional exchanges is 
not considered. Trades not codified as "regular trades" have been discarded. Trades 
performed at the same market, at the same price, and with the same time stamp are treated as 
just one trade. All quote and trade registers previous to the opening quote or posterior to the 
16:00, the official closing time, are dropped. The overnight changes in quotes are treated as 
missing values. Quotes with bid-ask spreads lower than or equal to zero or quoted depth equal 
to zero have also been eliminated. When prices and quotes must be considered together, the 
so-called "five seconds rule" (see Lee and Ready, 1991) has been applied. This rule assigns to 
each trade the first quote stamped at least five seconds before the trade itself. 
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Following previous empirical studies, a trade is classified as buyer (seller) initiated when 
the price is closer to the ask (bid) than to the bid (ask). From now on, first ones are called 
"buys" and the second ones are called "sells". The trade indicator x t equals 1 for buys, -1 for 
sells, and 0 for trades with execution price equal to the quote midpoint. A change in quotes is 
computed as the difference between the quote associated to the trade at t+ 1 and the quote 
associated with trade at t: I1qt=(qt - qt-l). Eight trading-time dummies are constructed: one for 
trades during the first half-hour of trading, five for each trading hour between 10:00 a.m. and 
15:00 p.m. and, finally, the last trading hour has been divided in two half-hour intervals. This 
procedure isolates the opening and closing periods of the session. 
Five exogenous variables are included in vector MCt. The trade Size, measured by the 
number of shares (Vt). The time in seconds since the previous trade (Tt). Immediacy costs, 
measured by the quoted bid-ask spread (5't). Quoted depth (QDt) , computed as the average 
between the number of shares offered at the best ask and bid prices. Volatility (Rt ), measured 
by the implicit volatility in the time series of I1qt (er,), obtained using the GARCH(l, I) model 
(8), estimated by maximum likelihood and with the robust variance-covariance matrix of 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992, and Bollerslev, 
Engle and Nelson, 1994 for reviews of this type of models). 2 All coefficients are statistically 
significant. 
{
l1q, = (.0309)£'_1 + cS, 
0;2 = (2.2E - 5) + (.0235)~_1 + (.9664)£'~1 
Ad) - R2 : 0.001497, Prob(F) = 0.0000 
(8) 
Next section exposes the dynamic simulation procedure used to estimate the information-
asymmetry risk associated to each IBM trade executed during the sample period analyzed. 
4. Estimation of the trade-specific information-asymmetry risk 
The impulse-response function of (7) is our estimator of the trade-specific adverse 
selection costs. The VMA representation of (7) is approximated by Monte Carlo simulation 
(notice that the model is non-linear). The simulated impulse-response function provides an 
estimation of the accumulated impact of each trade on quotes, conditional on market 
2 This model offers the best fitting among all those tested, including ARCH and EGARCH models. 
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conditions and trade features. Denote this conditional accumulated impact by 
I I (I!:,.q I I v 2 t ' MC I , D I ). A larger expected impact should be interpreted as a higher 
information-asymmetry risk associated to the trade. 
To perform the simulation we need to define a generating process for MCt ' = (VI, Tt, st, 
QDt, Rt). It is assumed that each component of MCt follows a general probabilistic process, 
exogenous to the model (7), approximated by a linear autoregressive model AR(Pk) like (9), 
where Pk, k={ 1, ... ,S}, must be determined empirically. Model (9) is estimated by GLS, and 
dummy variables are included to control for the deterministic intraday components. 
(9) 
Once (7)-(9) have been estimated, the simulation procedure for each of the IBM trades will 
be the following: 
Step # I: Use (9), k={ I , ... ,S}, to predict the future values of MCt needed to proceed with the 
simulation of (7). Assume that u, ,t - N(f..4, d;), where f..4 and (J'; are estimated through the 
mean and variance of the GLS residuals of (9). The initial conditions McL for i=I, ... ,Pk and 
V k, correspond to the values associated to the Pk trades that precede the one simulated. 
Step #2: Obtain the impulse-response function of (7), n periods into the future, using the 
predicted values of MC/ for k={l , ... ,S} in step #l. In order to do that, assume that every trade 
generates a unitary shock (v? t = I) and is executed after a steady state period, defined by 
X t_1 = ... = x t- 5 = 0 and /).qt-l = ... = /).qt-5 = 0.
3 This simulation exercise leads to a realization 
of the impUlse-response function for a given MCt path. The accumulated impact 
J/ (I!:,.ql I v2•p MG ,DJ for the case of infinite order polynomials appears in equation (l0). 
The asterisk means a simulated value, not observed. 
3 Obviously, trades were not generally executed after such a steady state period. However, this hypothesis allows 
isolating the impact associated to a trade from the impact of previous trades, 
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(10) 
Step #3: Repeat steps #1 and #2 10.000 times. The 10.000 estimated conditional values for 
each step nj (j=l, ... ,n) of the impulse-response function are averaged to obtain the final 
impulse-response function of the trade, 
~ I lO.OOO~. 
I, (f).q, Iv 2,,,MC,,D,)=-- LI/(f).q,lv2,,,MC,,D,). (11) 
10.000 i=l 
In this paper n=50, a period we will evidence to be more than enough for prices to reflect 
all the infonnation impounded by a trade. The order of the autoregressive process in (9) 
depends on the variable considered, but it is never greater than Pk = 5 (likelihood ratio tests 
show that longer lags are not statistically significant for any MC,k). Moreover, following 
Hasbrouck (1991a,b), de Jong et al. (1995), Dufour and Engle (2000) and Escribano and 
Pascual (2000), the polynomials in the V AR model (7) are truncated at lag five. 
Some trades in the sample period are not simulated. The expected impact of a given trade 
should depend on the impact of similar preceding trades. For that reason, the expected impact 
of the first trade in February is obtained with the VAR model (7) estimated using all trades in 
January (around 24.000 trades). The simulation of the second trade in February is obtained 
using the V AR model estimated with the data of all the trades in January but the first one and 
adding the fonnerly simulated trade, and so on. In this manner, the coefficients of the V AR 
model are also actualized in the midtenn. This implies that trades in January are not going to 
be simulated. Because of the definition of the trade indicator Xl, it is not possible to simulate 
trades with execution price equal to the quote midpoint <-t = 0). Finally, the conditional 
expectation of X t has to take values in the range of possible values [-1, 1] during all the 
simulation steps, something that may not be the case for extreme values of MCt . Through the 
simulation procedure this observations are identified and discarded from the study. At the 
end, nearly 80.000 trades remain. 
All dummies, except the one corresponding to the 12:00-13:00 interval (D,4), were 
\0 
included initially in the estimation interacting with contemporaneous and lagged values of the 
trade indicator Xt. Nonetheless, preliminary F tests showed that only the dummy variables 
affecting to the contemporaneous value of Xt were jointly statistically significant. Moreover, 
only the dummy corresponding to the first trading interval (9:30-10:00 a.m.) resulted 
statistically significant at the S% level. Therefore, the VAR model finally estimated is (12), 
I1q, = I..:;lail1qt-l + I..:;J~ +,BtMC,JX'_i +A:;D;x, +v1" 
x, = I..:;I Ci!1q'_1 + I..:;Ja;' +,Bt 'MC,_i k-i + Ai'D,\_, + v2," (12) 
Table I displays the estimated coefficients of the VAR model (12) using all trades executed 
from January to June 1996 (both included). Results coincide with those found in previous 
research: a large-sized trade, executed a few seconds since the previous trade, in a period of 
high volatility and poor quoted liquidity has a larger expected impact on quotes, consistently 
with the adverse selection costs models previously referenced. 
[Table I] 
As an example, Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse-response function for a buy trade 
executed at 9:37:S0 a,m., with Vt = 1.000 shares, Tt = 2 seconds, SI = US$ 0.2S, QDt = 2.S00 
shares a~d R, = O,00278. 
[Figure 1] 
To compute the information-asymmetry risk that corresponds to a given trade 0SCt ), we 
first locate the step 1 of the simulation that reaches the 99% of the total estimated impact. For 
the trade in Figure 1, this percentage is achieved at the point marked by the vertical plane (1 = 
2S). Notice that the variable 1 will be an estimator of the time (in number of trades) required 
for prices to reflect all the information carried by the trade. The accumulated impact at this 
point is our estimation of the adverse selection costs for a particular trade. For the trade in 
Figure 1, ASCt = US$ 0.1099. 
Figure 2 displays the empirical distribution of the absolute value of ASCt for all trades 
simulated. Using the percentiles of this distribution, trades are classified in five groups, 
ASC(I) to ASC(S), from lower to higher adverse selection cost. One trade belongs to ASC(l) 
if I ASCt I < P(0.2S), to ASC(2) if P(2S) S I ASCt I < peSO), to ASC(3) if peSO) S I ASCt I < 
P(7S), to ASC(4) if P(7S) S I ASCt I < P(9S) and, finally, to ASC(S) if I ASCt I ~ P(9S), where 
P(y) represents the value of the y% percentile. Reference values are P(2S) = 0.OS03, peSO) = 
11 
0.0629, P(75) = 0.0855 and P(95) 
ASC(4). 
0.1292. Therefore, the trilde in Figure 1 belongs to 
[Figure 2] 
5. The intraday distribution of adverse selection costs. 
Empirical evidence suggests that adverse selection costs are not uniformly distributed 
throughout the trading session (e.g., Wei, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993; Lin et aI., 
1995, and Madhavan et aI., 1997). Usually, adverse selection costs decrease towards the end 
of the session, sometimes (see Madhavan et aI., 1997) together with an increase in inventory 
holding costs. This result could be explained by a higher concentration of information-
motivated versus liquidity-motivated trades during the initial intervals of the trading session. 4 
Figure 3 shows the empirical distribution of IBM trades by trading hour and adverse 
selection costs level, measured by ASCt . The number of trades corresponding to the time 
intervals [9:30,10:00), [15:00,15:30) and [15:30,16:00) has been multiplied by two in order to 
get comparable magnitudes. Bands of the same color represent the percentage of trades 
belonging to ASC(j), j={ 1 , ... ,5}, executed in each "hourly" interval. Thus, the eight bands of 
the same color sum to the 100%. The column height is the sum of all five percentages per 
interval; larger columns represent more intense trading periods. Figure 3 shows that the 
distribution of the trading activity exhibits the usual U-shaped pattern. Additionally, trades 
with higher expected adverse selection costs, ASC(4) and ASC(5), are concentrated at the 
extremities of the session: between 9:30 a.m. and 11 :00 a.m. and between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 
p.m. The 61 % of all trades belonging to ASC( 5) were performed during the opening (47%) 
and closing (14%) half-hours. Similarly, the 74% of all trades classified as ASC(4) were 
accomplished during these extreme intervals of the session, the 44.4% during the opening and 
closing half-hours, and the 25.66% only during the first half-hour. The opposite occurs with 
those trades with the lowest expected adverse selection costs. ASC( 1) trades are detected 
mainly in the middle of the session and only the 5.l4% were executed during the first half-
hour of trading. 
[Figure 3] 
4 There is also empirical evidence about regular patterns in volume and volatility (e.g., Harris, 1986; Jain and 
Joh, 1988; Mclnish and Wood, 1990a,b), and liquidity (e.g., McInish and Wood, 1992; Lee et aI., 1993, Chan et 
aI., 1995a,b) consistent with regular intraday differences in market making costs. Admati and Ptleiderer (1988), 
Brock and Kleidon (1992), Harris and Raviv (1993) and Handa and Schwartz (1996) offer alternative 
explanations for these deterministic findings. 
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Previous results manifest that the risk of trading with an informed agent is the highest 
during the opening intervals of each session (e.g., Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). The 
ASC(S) and ASC(4) trades represent more than the SO% of all trades observed between 9:30 
a.m. and 10:00 a.m., something that does not occur in any other hourly interval. At closing 
high risk trades are the 32.l9% of all trades executed. On the contrary, ASC(l) and ASC(2) 
trades represent the 2S.1S% of all trades during the opening period versus the 6S.93% 
between 1 :00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. 
6. Risk persistency 
The statistical significance of some lagged values of the trade indicator Xt in the estimation 
of model (12) (see Table I) implies that all the information carried by a trade is not 
instantaneously incorporated into prices. On the contrary, the model predicts a progressive 
adjustment of market quotes. 5 If this were the case, it should be expected to fmd additional 
trades taking profits from the temporal divergence between market quotes and the efficient 
price. Therefore, we should observe sequences of trades with similar (but decreasing) values 
of ASCt . This section studies this possible short-run persistency in the information-asymmetry 
risk by modeling the time series of ASCt . 
The usual unit-root tests (extended Dickey and Fuller, 1979, and Phillips and Perron, 1988) 
show that ASCt is an 1(0) process. Moreover, the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions indicate that ASCt can be modeled as an autoregressive process of finite order 
(AR(P)), withp at least equal to 3. The information inferred from the trading process and the 
possible transitory deviation between mt and qt are both expected to increase with ASC(j), 
j={ 1 , ... ,S}. Thus, our intuition is that the magnitude of the autoregressive coefficients of the 
AR(P) model should also increase with the estimated adverse selection costs level for the 
trade at time t. We proceed with the estimation of the truncated AR(S) model (13) for the time 
series of ASCt using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method. This model includes the 
dummy variables Q/ j={ 1 , ... ,S}, such that Qti equals 1 if ASCt E ASC(j) and 0 otherwise. 6 
These dummy variables define five thresholds in the autoregressive structure of ASCt • The 
variable Ut is the error term of the model. Table II summarizes the estimation. 
5 Hasbrouck (1996) remarks that NYSE specialists are obliged to avoid large variations in the stock price, which 
forces them to adjust the market quotes in a gradual manner. 
6 We have also considered an alternative specification for (13) using the dummy variables Dt instead of Qt to 
truncate the AR(S) structure. This alternative model would capture differences in the AR(S) coefficients per 
trading hour. The statistical tests performed do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of an equal AR(5) 
structure across trading hours. Therefore, we conclude that the results in Table II do are due to differences in 




Table II reveals significant differences in the autocorrelation structure of the time series 
ASCI across the five levels of adverse selection costs previously defined. Using the Wald test 
(e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) we reject (at the 5% level) the null hypothesis that the 
sums of the autoregressive coefficients corresponding to each pair ASC(j) and ASC(k), with 
j:;tk, are equal. The sum of the autoregressive coefficients increases with ASC(j), j={1 , ... 5}, 
meaning that trades with a high information-asymmetry risk (high ASCI value) are followed 
by similar risky trades more likely than trades with low information-asymmetry risk (low 
ASCI value) are followed by akin trades. In summary, Table II shows that the information-
asymmetry risk persists after the execution of a risky trade. Risk persistency does augment 
with the adverse selection costs associated to the reference trade at time t. 7 
7. How fast do market quotes reflect the information inferred from trades? 
The simulation of the VAR model (12) produces two outputs: a trade-specific adverse 
selection costs measure (ASCI) and an estimation of the time (in number of events) that quotes 
require to incorporate all the information provided by a particular trade ('!t). This last 
estimation of the time needed for quote adjustment has been transformed into real time using 
the distance in seconds between the time stamp of the simulated trade and the time stamp of 
the 'l(th trade executed afterwards. Denote D('!)t to the series formed by the real-time distances 
obtained for all the IBM trades simulated. This section studies whether this time of 
adjustment depends on the market conditions and the particular characteristics (MCt ) of the 
corresponding trades. Table III summarizes the results of estimating the regression equation 
(14) using OLS robust to general heterokedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms 
(Newey and West, 1987). 
8 




7 Risk persistency could also be evaluated by applying the extended Dickey-Fuller unit roots test to each 
threshold in (13). However, the t statistics of such a test are neither standard nor currently tabulated. It should be 
necessary to obtain the critic values by simulation, something that is out of the scope of this paper. 
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For simplicity, we assume linearity in the specification. In order to control for the regular 
patterns in trading frequency evidenced in previous section, we include the dummy variables 
D/, (12:00-13:00 is the control interval). 
[Table Ill] 
As expected, the duration of the process of quote accommodation to the information 
revealed by a trade depends on the moment of execution. During the less frequently traded 
hours (between 12:00 and 14:00), the period of quote adjustment could go on around 12 
minutes (&/60). However, if the trade is executed during the first half-hour of the trading 
session, this time is reduced to 7.5 minutes ((&+y1)/60), approximately. Moreover, Table III 
shows that the adjustment period shortens with trade size and volatility; on the contrary, it 
lengthens with liquidity and the time since the execution of the preceding trade. Collectively, 
the higher the expected adverse selection costs, the shorter the adjustment period. 
We hypothesize that this last finding is due to an increase in the trading intensity following 
trades with high infonnation-asymmetry risk, what accelerates the process of price discovery. 
The increase in the trading intensity may reflect the sequential reaction of the market to the 
same informative signal, the imitative behavior by other agents in the market, or even order-
splitting by the same agent (see Easley and O'Hara. 1987: Biais et aL 1995, and He and 
Wang, 1995). As the results in the previous section suggest, the temporal disagreement 
between quoted prices and the efficient price may induce competition among traders. Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988), Easley and O'Hara (1992), and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) 
develop alternative models in which competition among informed traders favors price 
efficiency, specially if these traders' activity is based on the same informative signal. Our 
results imply that prices respond more quickly after a trade when adverse selection costs 
increase, which is consistent with this competitive argument and also with insider trading 
research findings (e.g., Holthausen et aI., 1990, and Lin and Rozeff, 1995). Section 9 will 
provide additional evidence that supports this hypothesis of "market acceleration" after an 
informative trade. 
Huang and Stoll (1996) measured the impact of a trade at time t by (qt+t* - qt)xt, where qt+'t* 
is the quote midpoint associated to the first trade executed (at least) 't* minutes later. The 
value of 't* is the same for all trades and arbitrarily fixed. Huang and Stoll (1996) used this 
measure to compare the adverse selection costs of a matched sample of NYSE and Nasdaq 
listed stocks. The evidence in this section indicates that the results of Huang and Stoll (1996) 
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are biased because the value of 't* depends on the moment of execution, the concrete 
characteristics of the trade and the specific market conditions. Moreover, the value of 'tt for a 
given trade may differ under different microstructures, which seems an interesting topic for 
future research. 
8. The relevance of adverse selection costs in a dynamic context 
A very prolific and successful line of research in microstructure has focused on the 
evaluation of the relative importance of the different market making costs: operative costs 
(see, Demsetz, 1968, and Roll, 1984), inventory holding costs (see Amihud and Mendelson, 
1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981 and 1983) and adverse selection costs. Several researchers have 
proposed alternative procedures to separate the also called immediacy costs (e.g., Stoll, 2000) 
in their theoretical components (e.g., Glosten and Harris, 1988; Stoll, 1989; George et al., 
1991; Madhavan et al., 1997, and Huang and Stoll, 1997, among others). The basic principle 
behind all these studies is that adverse selection costs can be estimated through the revision in 
the expectations about the true value of the stock after each new transaction (see also Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985). This is, precisely, what founds the use of the impulse-response function 
(10) as a trade-specific measure of adverse selection costs. Most of the studies previously 
referenced are based on structural models that explain the process of price discovery, where 
the trading process causes permanent and transitory effects in market prices. In these models 
it is assumed that all the information carried by a trade is incorporated instantaneously into 
prices. Therefore, trades have no lagged effects on prices. However, the results in previous 
sections suggest that market quotes adjust progressively, because the initial impact of the 
trade does not reflect all the new information. Using the procedure suggested by Lin et al. 
(1995), we show that rejecting the existence of these lagged effects downward biases the 
estimation of the adverse selection costs component using structural models. 8 Equation (15) 
summarizes the method proposed by Lin et al. (1995), 
~ We choose Lin et al. (1995) because it is one of the most used models (e.g., Brockman and Chung, 1999). 
Moreover, this method does not require the estimation of a dynamic equation; so, our estimation results will be 
less affected by the elimination of those trades that could not be simulated (see section 4). As far as we know, 
there is no study making a "horse race" with all these methods, something that is really surprising given that the 
empirical results of all these models are quite inconsistent. Considering all trades executed from January to June 
1996, we obtain that, in average, adverse selection costs represent the 7,66% of all market making costs using 
Madhavan et al. (1997), 16% using Lin et al. (1995), 21 % using Glosten and Harris (1988) and almost negligible 
using Huang and Stoll (1997). Although Huang and Stoll (1997) is, probably, the most general model, its main 
advantage lies in the fact that it allows to distinguish between inventory holding and operative costs. Our 
interest, however, is focused on adverse selection costs only. Finally, the parametric simplicity of the Lin et al.'s 
(1995) model facilitates to perform certain extensions directed to control for several factors. 
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(15) 
where Pt represents the execution price of the trade, et is the error tenn and 11; - q,_11 is the 
half-effective spread. The parameter 8 measures adverse selection costs; notice that 8 is the 
percentage of the effective spread that is not realized due to the immediate change in the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread after the trade. Under the assumption that trades incorporate at 
once the infonnation revealed by the trade, this immediate change equals the total impact of 
the trade. Using the sample of all trades previously simulated, equation (15) is estimated by 
OLS robust to any potential heterokedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown fonn in the 
error terms (Newey and West, 1987). According to the Lin et al.'s (1995) model, adverse 
selection costs for the sample of simulated trades supposes the 8 = 26.3% of the full 
immediacy costs. 
The first column of coefficients in Table IV shows the results of the estimation of equation 
(16) using again the Newey and West (1987) method. This model is a generalization of (15) 
that controls for several regularities: the trading interval (by means of the dummy variables 
D," , h={ I , ... ,8}) and the risk of asymmetric infonnation (by the dummy variables Qti , where 
Qti equals 1 if ASCt E ASC(j), j={l , ... ,5}, and 0 otherwise). The variable Ut is the error tenn. 
i=2 h=1 
",,4 
Table IV shows that the percentage of total immediacy costs due to adverse selection costs 
significantly augments with ASC(j), from the 15,97% for ASC(l) trades to the 29,95% for 
ASC(5) trades. Only one intraday effect becomes statistically significant: for trades executed 
during the first half-hour of trading the percentage of market making costs due to adverse 
selection costs increases in 2,55 percentage points. We replicate the previous estimation 
exercise using the results of our simulation exercise. The second column of coefficients in 
Table IV contains the estimation of (16) but replacing the dependent variable I1qt by the initial 
impact of the trade obtained from the simulation of the VAR model (12). Again, adverse 
selection costs increase from the 16.14% for ASC( 1) trades to the 26,28% for ASC( 5) trades. 
These percentages are much the same as those obtained with the observed data. With the 
simulated initial impacts, the percentage of immediacy costs due to adverse selection costs 
increases for trades accomplished during the initial and final hourly intervals of the session. If 
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only the initial impact of the trade is considered, adverse selection costs represent, in average 
terms, no more than the 30-32% of the effective spread. 
However, as previous simulation and estimation results indicated, the total impact of a 
trade is more than the initial adjustment of quotes. There are significant lagged effects, 
probably linked with a progressive adjustment of market quotes to the new information. For 
each trade, we compute the ratio of the total impact obtained by the simulation of (12) to the 
half-effective spread, 
In medians, the simulated total impact represents the 66% of the effective spread for ASC( 1) 
trades, the 80% for ASC(3) trades and more than the 100% for ASC(5) trades. This result 
manifests that adverse selection costs in a dynamic framework are more important than what 
the current structural model's estimators would suggest. The quoted spread for a frequently 
traded stock like IBM (most of the time equal to the tick, US$ 118 in 1996) does not 
compensate the costs of providing liquidity to high expected adverse selection costs trades. 
9. Adverse selection costs and market behavior 
This section focuses on the market behavior during the short-term period that comes after 
the execution of a trade. We analyze whether this behavior depends on the adverse selection 
costs expected for that trade. There is a lot of empirical evidence about unusual market 
patterns around localized informative events. The quoted liquidity, the market activity and the 
volatility of prices experiment anomalous behaviors around profit (e.g., Lee et aI., 1993, and 
Krinsky and Lee, 1996), corporate takeovers (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994) and dividend 
(e.g., Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986, and Koski and Michaely, 2000) announcements. Recently, 
similar behaviors have been evidenced around trading halts (Corwin and Lipson, 2000, and 
Goldstein and Kavajezc, 2000b) and changes in monetary policy (Kavajecz, 1999). These 
unusual patterns generally consist on increased trading activity, volatility and illiquidity (in 
terms of wider spreads and smaller depth) both before and after the event. The pre-event 
behavior is attributed to the enlargement of the information asymmetries between informed an 
uninformed traders generated by the anticipation of the informative shock (e.g., Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1991, and Seppi, 1992). Post-event behavior is more difficult to interpret. If the 
public announcement resolves the information asymmetry, the market should return to its 
non-event behavior. Nonetheless, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest a model in which 
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certain traders are able to make superior judgments from earning announcements than others. 
This situation increases information asymmetry after the announcements and produces less 
liquidity and the possibility of more trading activity and volatility. 
We consider the fifteen minutes interval that follows the execution of each particular 
trade. 9 We focus on market behavior during the post-event period because the adverse 
selection costs estimator (ASCt ) measures the permanent impact of the unexpected (and 
therefore not anticipated) component of a given trade. The market behavior prior to the trade 
cannot be attributed to that trade. Our null hypothesis is that, after a trade, the trading activity, 
the price volatility and the illiquidity of the stock increase with the adverse selection costs 
estimated for that trade. In this study, any unusual post-event market behavior may be 
imputed to the greater information content of high- ASCt trades and the progressive adjustment 
of market quotes to that information (both already evidenced in previous sections). 
Event studies compare the periods surrounding the events under analysis with a benchmark 
that is not influenced by such (or other) informational events. Such a methodology is not 
workable in our case because our events (trades) are not isolated from other similar events. 
Hence, the behavior of the market after a specific trade should depend not only on its 
information-asymmetry risk but also on the risk of ihe subsequent trades. It has been 
evidenced in previous sections that trades are usually followed by additional trades with a 
similar risk of being motivated by new information. This phenomenon produces clusters of 
trades that can be differentiated by the average level of adverse selection costs. Clusters of 
trades with a similar ASC(j) level, of equal sign and that are close in time can be associated to 
the same informational event. So, we proceed by filtering the sample in order to avoid 
possible biases in posterior tests induced by the presence of these groups of trades linked to 
the same infonnational signal. When we observe a sequence of buys or sells with the same 
ASC(j) level that are very close one to the others, only the first trade of the sequence is 
included in the subsequent tests. 10 
Market behavior is represented by means of three dimensions: activity, volatility and 
liquidity. The number of trades executed and the accumulated volume (in number of shares) 
9 We consider 15 minutes because the results in Table III indicate that the impact of a trade can take around 12 
minutes, in average, to be negligible. 
10 In order to determine when successive trades are "very close in time" we compute the median of the seconds 
between two consecutive trades belonging to the same ASC(j) level, with j={ 1, ... ,5}. These medians are 30 for 
ASC(I) trades, 24 for ASC(2) and ASC(3) trades, 17 for ASC(4) trades and 13 for ASC(5) trades. If the time 
between to consecutive trades of the same type is less than the corresponding median, these trades are considered 
as originated by the same informative event. The analysis has been repeated using other criterions to filter the 
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measure market activity. Volatility is characterized by the variability of the ask (bid) price 
after buys (sells). Liquidity is measured in terms of both quoted spread and quoted depth. For 
each minute m={ 1 , ... , l5} that comes after a trade time-stamped at t we compute the following 
variables: (a) the number of shares transacted (VoI1+m ). (b) The number of trades reported 
(N~+m)' (c) The standard deviation of the asklbid price (VA1+m). (d) The average bid-ask 
spread (SPT,+m) and (e) the average quoted depth (DPT,+m) both weighted by time. 11 
We use the non-parametric rank test of Krustal and Wallis (1952) for equality of means to 
compare the previous variables in minutes. Trades are grouped according to the 
corresponding adverse selection costs level (ASCU), j={1 , ... ,5}). Activity, liquidity and 
volatility indicators usually show intraday regular patterns and, as was shown in section 5, 
adverse selection costs are not uniformly distributed throughout the trading seSSIOn. 
Therefore, we also separate trades according to the moment of execution and test for 
differences in medians between those trades accomplished during the same hourly interval. 
Comparisons are performed minute by minute. The variables are standardized by hourly 
interval. 12 Main findings are reported in the Appendix. The tables show the means of each 
variable by trading period and adverse selection costs level. The Kruskal-Wallis' test is 
realized against the alternative hypothesis of differences in means and also against the 
alternative hypothesis of mean of ASC(k) > mean of ASC(z), for k > z, k={2, ... ,5} and 
k={1 , ... ,4}. Bold format implies that means are significantly different (at least) at the 5% level 
in the sense that the mean of ASC(k) > mean of ASC(z), k> z. 
Table A.I and Table A.II in the Appendix evidence important differences in trading 
activity as the risk due to asymmetric information increases. As was suggested in section 7, 
trades with an high expected information content drive to an increase in the trading intensity, 
probably due to the successive reaction of the market to the new information and the 
competition among traders. As a consequence, the trading frequency and the traded volume 
augment. In most of the hourly intervals analyzed the significant differences extend across the 
15 minutes considered, mainly during the first half-hour of the trading session. Differences in 
sample and even using all trades in the sample. The main implications of the findings are equivalent in all cases. 
11 For trades stamped during the last quarter-hour of the trading session (15:45-16:00 h.) the values of all these 
variables are treated as missing for those minutes that include or exceed the official closing hour (16:00 h.). 
12 The standardization method is robust to outliers. For example, consider the observation that corresponds to the 
accumulated volume of the fifth minute after a trade time-stamped at 9:58:00 ( VOIIO:02:00-IO:02:59)' To standardize 
it, we subtract the median of Vol for all the minutes traded in the period 10:00 a.m. to II :00 a.m. during all the 
sample period. This difference is divided by the interquartile range of Vol. 
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volatility, on the contrary, are much less important. Table A.1II shows the average standard 
deviation of the ask price after buys. 13 Means are increasing with ASCU), implying that trades 
with greater adverse selection costs tend to increment the uncertainty about the true value of 
the stock. But in few cases these differences are statistically significant. Therefore, in a trade 
by trade basis, we do not found the volatility of quotes during a given interval of the session 
to depend on the information-asymmetry risk attached to the last trade executed. 
Table A.IV in the Appendix evidences that immediacy costs are increasing in adverse 
selection costs. For most of the trading intervals, the average quoted spread for each adverse 
selection costs level is statistically different during the 15 minutes analyzed. Wider quoted 
spreads are the result of the combination of a consumption effect caused by the increase in 
trading activity and a greater protectionism by liquidity providers facing an increase in 
adverse selection costs. Regarding the quoted depth, although ASC(5) (ASC(I)) trades are 
located in periods of higher (lower) depth than the other trades, there is not a strict increasing 
relationship between the quoted depth and ASC(j). But, it is observed that, during the 15 
minutes period, quoted depth tends to increase with less intensity (or even decrease) the 
higher the risk of asymmetric information assigned to the trade (see Table A.V in the 
Appendix).14 Therefore, quoted liquidity after a trade is characterized by higher immediacy 
costs and a depth level that reverts to its initial level at a more leisurely pace as we rise the 
adverse selection costs assigned to the trade. 
Globally, these findings suggest that agents in the market do base the evaluation of the 
informational content of trades on observable features (like trade size and time since the 
previous trade) and in the market situation (like price volatility and liquidity). Afterwards, 
agents react accordingly to their evaluation, altering (at least) the liquidity of the stock and the 
intensity of trading. This behavior is independent of the moment of the session. 
10. Conclusions 
This paper has evaluated the information-asymmetry risk of each IBM trade performed in 
the NYSE from February to June 1996. The trade-specific estimator of adverse selection costs 
is the impulse-response function associated to the VAR model introduced by Hasbrouck 
(1991 a): the higher the estimated permanent impact on market quotes for a particular trade the 
13 Results using the variability of the bid price after sells and the variability of the midpoint of the bid-ask spread 
after any trade are similar. 
14 Depth quoted at the bid price after sells shows a similar behavior. This table does not report the results of the 
Krustal-Wallis tests because the casuistic is too much broad. 
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higher the adverse selection costs. The Hasbrouk's model has been extended to allow 
conditioning the impact on the simultaneous effect of several trade characteristics and market 
conditions. This procedure differs from those currently in the literature in several aspects: 
(a) It is possible to characterize the adverse selection costs of a particular trade as a function 
of several variables (like trade size, time since the previous trade performed, liquidity and 
volatility) acting simultaneously. These variables had been considered independently so 
far. Thus, the estimated impact of a large-sized trade will be different depending on the 
quoted spread and depth, the time since the previous trade executed etc. 
(b) Current methods that measure adverse selection costs, based on structural models of quote 
formation, provide an average value for all trades executed during a given sample period, 
but are not able to obtain a trade-specific estimation. This paper has shown that risky 
trades are not uniformly distributed throughout the trading session. 
(c) Structural models (e.g., Stoll, 1989; Glostenand Milgrom, 1988; Madhavan et aI., 1997; 
Huang and Stoll, 1997) only take into account the instantaneous impact of a trade in 
prices. On the contrary, the Hasbrouck's (1991a,b) VAR model sets a dynamic framework 
that makes possible to capture also the lagged effects of trades. Thus, this paper has shown 
that structural models like Lin et al. (1995) undervalue the relevance of adverse selection 
costs. Adverse selection costs estimations based on structural models may be biased 
downward because they do not consider the lagged effects of trades on prices. 
(d) The simulation of the VAR model also provides an estimation of the time (in number of 
events) that quotes require in order to incorporate all the information carried by a 
particular trade. It has been shown that as the risk of asymmetric information increases the 
trading activity also augments and this accelerates the process of price discovery. 
Finally, this paper has evidenced that the market behavior in the short-term period that 
comes after a trade depends on the information-asymmetry risk associated to that trade. 
Differences are especially relevant in terms of activity and liquidity: the 15 minutes that come 
after a trade are more active and less liquid as the risk of information asymmetries associated 
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TABLE I 
Estimation of the V AR model 
This table reports the GLS coefficients of the VAR model in (12) using all IBM trades from January to June 1996', = trade size (in 
number of shares). Tt = time (in seconds) since the preceding trade.s, = bid-ask spread. QD. = quoted depth (average between depth at 
the ask and depth at the bid prices)R, = volatility (implicit volatility otZlq, estimated with a GARCH (I, I) model),q, = quote midpoint, 
x, = I for buys, -I for sells and zero otherwise. 
(Coef.x 1000)' !1q, X, (Coef.xIOOO) !1q, X, 
!1q'_1 
-27.2 -4174.8 x,R, 509.9 
!1q'_2 22.5 296.8 X,_tR,_t -18.5 13905 
!1q'_3 24.8 590.8 X'_2 R'_2 98.8 -7018.6 
!1q'_4 16.3 383.8 X'_3 R'_3 -36.6 -2871.3 
!1q,_s 13.7 383.8 X'_4 R'_4 -43.2 -8484.2 
X, 
-0.7408 x,_sR,_s 237.9 2427.3 
X'_I 2.4121 301.2 X,S, 116.8 
X'_2 0.2684 127.7 X'_IS'_I 17.6 853.7 
X'_3 
-0.5438 48.5 X'_2 S'_2 -7.25 -102.7 
X'_4 
-0.6255 55.5 X'_3 S'_3 -5.72 -83.7 
X,_s 
-1.7085 44.4 X,_4 S ,_4 -3.9 -51.6 
XIV, 0.000884 X,_,S,_, -10.8 -118.4 
X,_I V:-I 0.000299 0.0023 x,QD, -0.0329 
X'_2 V'_2 0.0000353 -0.0021 x'_IQD'_1 -0.0026 0.3559 
X,-3V:-3 
-0.0000343 
-0.0018 x'_2QD'_2 0.0072 0.0849 
X'_4 V'_4 0.0000272 
-0.0014 x'_3QD'_3 0.0053 0.1871 
X,_sV,_s 0.0000623 -0.0022 x'_4QD'_4 0.0013 0.0344 
x,T, 
-0.0607 x'_5QD'_5 0.0035 -0.0186 
X,_tT,_t 
-0.0189 0.0101 x,D,t 1.642 
X'_2 T'_2 0.0004 
-0.231 X,_ID/_I 34.2 
X,-31;-3 
-0.0024 
-0.265 Adj-R2 : 0.2001 
X'_4 T'_4 0.0005 
-0.1674 N° obs.: 125164 
X,_s~_s 0.0094 -0.1246 
F(42,125164): 746.58 Prob>F: 0.0000 




This table shows the estimated GLS coefficients of the truncatedAR(5) model in (13). The time seriesASe; is built with the estimated 
adverse selection costs corresponding to all IBM trades executed from February to June 1996. A trade belongs to the setSC(I) if j4SCl< 
P(0.25), to ASC(2) ifP(25):> IASCI < P(50), to ASC(3) ifP(50):> IASCI < P(75). to ASC(4) ifP(75):> IASCI< P(95) and. finally, to ASC(5) 
if IASCI ~ P(95), where P(y) represents the value of the y% percentile of the empirical distribution oJISe;. The dummy Q! equals I if 
A se; E ASCU).j={l •...• 5). and 0 otherwise . 
. 
Coefficient Q; : ASC(\) Q2: ASC(2) Q3: ASC(3) Q:: ASC(4) Q5: ASC(5) 
cA.; 0.3333 0.4082 0.5896 0.7427 0.8964 
q;; 0.1279 0.1229 0.1191 0.0755 -0.0285 
cA; 0.1222 0.0907 0.0436 0.0257 0.0719 
1>: 0.1007 0.0918 0.0729 0.0421 0.0153 
1>5' 0.1513 0.1693 0.1298 0.1402 0.1291 
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TABLE III 
Speed of adjustment of quotes to the information inferred from trades. 
This table summarizes the estimation of (14) by OLS robust tcheterokedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). The variabler is an estimation of the time (in 
. number of events) that quotes need to capture all the information provided by a given 
trade. This 1 comes from the simulation of the V AR model (12) for all IBM trades. and 
it is stock-specific. Z(1), is the series fornled with a1l1, expressed in real time (seconds). 
V. = trade size (in number of shares).T. = time (in seconds) since the preceding tradeS, 
= bid-ask spread. QD, = quoted depth (average between depth alhe ask and depth at the 
bid prices). R,= volatility (implicit volatility of D.q, estimated with a GARCH (1.1) 
model). andN. j={1 •...• 8} are dummy variables that control for deterministiantraday 
patterns. 
Variable Coefficient" 
~ (const.) 721.41 
V, (4) -0.0051 
T, (ci) 2.1679 
R, ( 8,) -26495.11 
S, (Cl) -424.72 
QD, (c) ) 0.4391 
D,' [9:30 10:00) -263.98 
D,2 [10:0011:00) -232.71 
D: [11:0012:00) -108.26 
D: [13:0014:00) 7.6262 
D,' [14:0015:00) -123.29 
D,' [15:0015:30) -225.56 
D,' [15:3016:00) -276.85 
Adj.-R-: 0.2346 
Prob>F 0.0000 
"" Format in bold means statistically signiticant, at least. at the 5% level. 
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TABLE IV 
Adverse selection costs over the total immediacy costs 
This table summarizes the results of estimating the percentage of the effective spread 
that is due to adverse selection costs. The Lin et al.'s (1995) model has been extended in 
order to control for intraday effects and the risk level due to information asymmetries, 
see equation (16). The model is estimated by theNewey and West's (1987) method. 
Two alternative dependent variables have been used: the observed change in the 
midpoint of the bid ask spread (the original variable in Lin et aI., 1995) and the initial 
( first-step) impact estimated by the simulation of the V AR model in (12). 
Initial impact 
Coefficient (x 1 00)- !;,.q, (simulation) 
q 15.9793 16.1386 
4! 5.1832 2.8813 
0 10.5893 5.1355 
Cb 12.2063 6.4202 
~ 13.9802 10.1475 
~) [9:30 10:00) 2.5499 1.9521 
~; [10:00 II :00) 1.2797 1.0046 
~~ [11:00 12:00) 0.7079 0.2678 
~ [13:0014:00) 0.5919 0.0478 
~; [14:0015:00) 0.6355 0.0242 
~~ [15:0015:30) 1.2583 0.7867 
q, [15:30 16:00) 0.6813 0.7202 
Adj.-R-(NW): 0.2055 Adj.-R" (NW): 0.2121 




The impact of a buyer initiated trade on the quote midpoint (simulation). 
FIGURE 2 
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APPENDIX 
Means by m inute and risk of asymmetric information 
A.I: Accumulated volume 
9:30 -10 1+1 1+2 le 3 1+4 Ic5 1+6 117 1+8 
ASC(I) 8738.48 9523.33 9891.82 9439.70 9814.24 9853.64 10400.00 8923.03 
ASC(2)' 10339.29 10074.79 10508.05 10505.09 9703.08 10146.27 9949.11 10317.28 
ASC(3) • 14156.17 13314.74 13504.72 12757.71 13010.21 12133.33 12228.04 12729.00 
ASC(4): 15562.73 14806.94 14669.24 14474.18 14609.01 14316.95 145:17.48 13960.37 
ASC(5) 16872.73 17855.72 17614.81 17587.10 18102.05 16530.06 16575.51 16542.08 
10 -11 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 
ASC(I) 7747.74 7899.84 7997.24 8159.27 7858.68 7882.37 8082.42 7923.90 
ASC(2) 9439.66 9523.24 9137.15 9519.43 9376.45 9193.76 9251.10 9391.34 
ASC(3) 11787.51 11537.53 11295.97 10910.92 11015.54 11037.04 105:10.22 10343.63 
ASC(4) 14677.65 14241.36 13302.47 13084.94 13699.63 13412.59 138(,7.72 13152.65 
ASC(5) 21014.95 20511.69 21694.84 21795.11 21361.69 18953.26 18152.72 17567.12 
11 -12 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 Iq 1+8 
ASC(I) 6168.29 6060.08 6132.71 5954.58 5663.18 5780.32 5834.29 6398.95 
ASC(2) 7465.27 7233.15 7160.01 6855.94 6821.98 6543.41 6576.45 6793.22 
ASC(3) 8573.29 7721.09 7781.97 8084.05 8001.28 7582.52 7273.96 7460.27 
ASC(4) 10656.05 10407.48 10858.71 10127.05 10700.00 10226.84 10580.53 9627.36 
ASC(5) 18989.61 17999.13 18056.28 16159.74 16352.81 17753.68 173 76.62 15823.81 
12 -13 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 le? 1+8 
ASC(I) 5401.03 5180.15 4885.60 5035.22 4796.40 4732.34 46~i6.30 4862.31 
ASC(2) 6794.95 6723.39 5633.01 6366.92 6205.61 5790.66 5912.73 5706.78 
ASC(3) 7244.72 7038.06 6290.43 6007.58 6403.91 6979.10 6344.16 6109.57 
ASC(4) 9761.22 9079.59 8847.61 8539.94 8453.69 8121.13 8582.92 8337.63 
ASC(5) 22986.60 15871.13 26021.65 17380.41 15579.38 10712.37 160:~5.77 20267.01 
13 -14 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 '1<7 1+8 
ASC(I) 5173.13 4920.88 5128.85 5204.01 5121.36 4889.95 5277.24 5162.98 
ASC(2) 6823.10 6471.28 6380.20 5904.63 5893.82 6553.72 6019.38 6125.56 
ASC(3) 7619.37 6526.29 6666.61 6827.52 6707.10 6984.57 6983.35 6291.85 
ASC(4) 9521.70 9764.41 9481.25 8839.58 7830.21 7614.76 82J.9.51 7955.90 
ASC(5) 13481.54 7009.23 16901.54 6740.00 21283.08 10829.23 12116.92 8550.77 
14 -15 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 -i·'7 1+8 
ASC(I) 6267.99 6180.64 6793.01 6344.72 6671.23 6959.35 . 6741.20 6481.41 
ASC(2) 8766.81 7666.87 7928.65 7705.22 7808.08 7660.22 7577.87 7586.14 
ASC(3) 8544.57 8194.67 8668.61 8328.69 9273.08 8536.79 8355.86 9202.21 
ASC(4) 9738.45 9559.69 9119.08 9509.49 9138.16 9369.28 9938.55 10030.53 
ASC(5) 12556.12 13638.78 12205.10 10083.16 9604.59 9954.59 102:\9.29 10273.98 
15-15:30 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 T+8 
ASC(I) 7854.50 8392.35 8117.99 8126.98 8037.58 8370.87 7982.82 8446.44 
ASC(2) 9797.80 9107.97 9344.76 9410.59 9298.95 8403.14 8539.73 9475.47 
ASC(3) 11605.51 11030.37 10920.84 10341.03 10887.38 10450.84 10764.11 10079.07 
ASC(4) 13222.52 12420.42 11916.12 11968.54 11706.95 12139.63 110S0.57 11997.90 
ASC(5) 18397.69 17333.53 16806.94 14296.53 13413.87 15658.38 14899.42 16175.72 
15:30 -16 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 T+8 
ASC(I) 7581.39 8399.58 8361.57 8141.90 7869.23 9458.86 7637.52 8547.84 
ASC(2) 8957.03 8236.21 8754.93 8602.90 8746.53 7944.23 7976.96 8101.35 
ASC(3) 9980.07 10182.77 10912.49 11146.82 10479.22 10904.55 11945.98 10527.96 
ASC(4) 11921.37 11422.13 11517.88 12697.20 11476.44 10922.45 12169.87 12283.16 
ASC(5) 27828.33 23908.29 26377.23 29627.89 29899.44 27354.76 24135.26 22889.33 
~ 0 FOllnal m bold ImplIes a slallsllcal dIfference m means wllh respecl 10 ASC(4) (ASCU) -ASC(4)) 10 (alleasl) Ihe 510. level 

































































































1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
10096.97 8664.85 9834.24 10081.82 8966.67 
9274.44 9835.74 9597.99 9750.18 9160.83 
11768.02 11624.28 12939.50 12379.77 12093.64 
14110.94 13663.16 13025.82 13241.77 13122.46 
16077.71 16093.11 16492.52 15297.95 16019.06 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
8046.52 7684.81 7704.41 7319.60 7528.25 
9031.72 8697.08 9135.26 8666.62 9322.52 
9658.44 10067.73 9705.46 9675.16 9353.37 
12271.11 12297.53 12204.07 11241.54 11866.85 
15568.48 17161.41 16749.46 19173.10 17579.89 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
5895.37 6223.69 6401.34 5914.33 5486.72 
6592.51 6732.39 6803.31 6953.07 6777.05 
7188.26 7648.29 7382.82 7425.86 7350.61 
9828.38 9507.68 9405.84 9669.57 9280.02 
14063.20 14902.17 14148.05 14889.61 14288.75 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
4514.55 4540.93 4790.08 5045.50 4908.95 
5587.20 5337.51 5160.62 5608.93 5494.53 
6726.65 5832.47 5796.17 6270.21 5958.65 
7937.92 7965.12 6913.89 7523.44 7244.43 
12618.56 13106.19 15839.18 12460.83 12638.14 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
5156.98 5045.77 4969.45 5103.96 5182.31 
6134.62 5924.09 5920.79 6183.99 6285.67 
6820.33 7354.60 6658.37 6686.59 6669.76 
7705.21 8198.44 7789.41 8122.92 8372.40 
6347.69 9710.77 14543.08 9643.08 12740.00 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
7156.82 6860.12 7578.33 7107.54 7432.18 
8009.76 8877.44 8630.45 8167.37 8500.25 
8547.70 8751.87 8845.68 8788.66 8758.37 
9347.16 9421.43 9961.35 9786.20 9654.99 
11097.96 10643.88 10264.80 10384.69 10729.59 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
9101.48 8075.30 8403.89 7510.20 8204.83 
8460.06 8603.77 8382.60 8724.42 8054.09 
10257.48 11114.30 10845.70 9913.46 10860.00 
11567.22 11544.48 11560.82 11232.45 11276.82 
13238.73 15288.44 14502.31 14825.43 12958.38 
1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
8327.73 7533.26 8577.96 8645.00 8927.11 
8450.54 8390.02 8775.00 9358.70 8200.00 
10562.12 11312.92 11623.17 11054.76 11694.56 
12070.29 11522.81 12581.85 12934.06 13214.68 
23597.64 26140.17 35745.28 21279.61 28244.44 
9:30 -10 (+ I ( c2 (+3 
ASql) 3.121 3.309 3.142 
ASq2) 3.562 3.507 3.469 
ASq3) 3.979 4.029 3.909 
ASC(4) 4.452 4.355 4.274 
ASC(5) 4.630 4.720 4.694 
10 -11 1+1 ( c2 (+3 
ASql) 2.905 2.844 2.807 
ASq2) 3.304 3.183 3.075 
ASq3) 3.705 3.623 3.480 
ASq4) 3.990 3.898 3.848 
ASq5) 4.457 4.595 4.332 
11 -12 1+1 (+2 (+3 
ASql) 2.343 2.297 2.302 
ASq2) 2.762 2.655 2.593 
ASq3) 2.937 2.877 2.767 
ASq4) 3.376 3.406 3.314 
ASq5) 3.931 4.022 4.017 
12 -13 (+1 1+2 1+3 
ASql) 2.104 2.030 1.962 
ASq2) 2.437 2.377 2.217 
ASq3) 2.541 2.420 2.312 
ASq4) 2.916 2.793 2.753 
ASq5) 3.443 3.701 3.639 
13 -14 1+1 1+2 (+3 
ASql) 1.986 1.966 1.951 
ASq2) 2.400 2.326 2.234 
ASq3) 2.471 2.406 2.368 
ASq4) 2.905 2.832 2.875 
ASq5) 2.908 2.354 3.108 
14 -15 HI 1+2 1+3 
ASql) 2.398 2.333 2.381 
ASq2) 2.874 2.684 2.605 
ASq3) 3.000 2.866 2.825 
ASq4) 3.161 3.134 3.070 
ASq5) 3.541 3.551 3.622 
15-15:30 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASql) 2.902 2.881 2.937 
ASq2) 3.320 3.066 3.031 
ASq3) 3.564 3.480 3.421 
ASq4) 3.919 3.861 3.760 
Asq5) 4.353 4.439 4.214 
15:30-16 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASql) 3.136 3.213 3.236 
ASq2) 3.235 3.151 3.243 
ASq3) 3.554 3.530 3.590 
Asq4) 3.968 3.816 3.801 
ASq5) 4.837 4.899 4.965 
(+4 (+5 (+6 
3.279 3.167 3.212 
3.343 3.344 3.250 
3.858 3.863 3.877 
4.232 4.295 4.228 
4.674 4.576 4.588 
(+4 ( c5 (+6 
2.775 2.776 2.741 
3.090 3.063 3.042 
3.392 3.370 3.448 
3.834 3.709 3.722 
4.389 4394 4.264 
(+4 (+5 (+6 
2.243 2.231 2.250 
2.563 2.528 2.536 
2.724 2.741 2.739 
3.\07 3.183 3.138 
4.087 4.212 4.022 
(+4 (+5 1+6 
1.989 1.990 1.929 
2.221 2.209 2.183 
2.328 2.254 2.329 
2.734 2.661 2.690 
3.289 3.072 3.258 
(+4 1+5 1+6 
1.937 1.900 1.872 
2.140 2.144 2.129 
2.245 2.410 2.365 
2.714 2.667 2.575 
2.954 3.323 2.954 
1+4 1+5 (+6 
2.336 2.331 2.336 
2.565 2.527 2.522 
2.826 2.850 2.788 
3.072 3.068 3039 
3.561 3.408 3.270 
(+4 (+5 (+6 
2.954 2.862 2.856 
3.134 3.081 2.966 
3.410 3.429 3.383 
3.600 3.617 3.745 
4.139 4.092 3.913 
(+4 1+5 1+6 
3.256 3.193 3.330 
3.298 3.282 3.240 
3.569 3.517 3.471 
3.831 3.698 3.712 
4.837 4.853 4.827 
APPENDIX (Cant.) 
A.II: Number of trades 
















































1+9 1+10 1+11 (+12 (+13 (+14 (C 15 
3.173 3.188 3.164 3.230 3.173 3.167 3.185 
3.239 3.236 3.142 3.175 3.098 3.200 3.044 
3.779 3.665 3.719 3.634 3.663 3.680 3.676 
4.\08 4.104 4.117 4.054 3.985 3.959 3.941 
4.258 4.350 4.408 4.372 4.384 4.227 4.243 
(+9 (+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
2.730 2.661 2.689 2.711 2.665 2.599 2.642 
2.981 2.932 2.974 2.921 2.949 2.922 3.017 
3.278 3.256 3.234 3.244 3.199 3.154 3.246 
3.702 3.604 3.529 3.448 3.477 3.359 3.446 
4.242 3.905 3.845 4.005 3.565 3.644 3.886 
(+9 1+10 (+11 (+12 1+13 1+14 (+15 
2.223 2.219 2.208 2.228 2.170 2.171 2.198 
2.405 2.466 2.365 2.391 2.354 2.374 2.294 
2.594 2.579 2.490 2.632 2.573 2.494 2.454 
3.186 3.024 3.035 3.149 3.047 3.055 2.997 
3.987 4.022 4.069 3.771 3.827 3.810 3.797 
1+9 (+10 (+11 (+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
1.879 5.000 1.864 1.870 1.928 1.929 1.870 
2.077 2.092 2.061 2.067 2.037 2.042 1.959 
2.234 2.276 2.213 2.204 2.221 2.175 2.158 
2.592 2.540 2.508 2.608 2.492 2.563 2.553 
3.082 3.433 3.278 3.649 3.577 3.526 3.433 
1+9 1+10 (+11 (+12 (+13 HI4 1+15 
1.916 1.914 1.952 1.933 1.837 1.955 1.948 
2.127 2.139 2.146 2.098 2.103 2.148 2.188 
2.274 2.291 2.196 2.314 2.213 2.197 2.205 
2.514 2.550 2.509 2.569 2.516 2.493 2.505 
2.985 2.477 2.308 2.723 2.831 2.846 2.969 
1+9 1+10 1+11 (+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
2.337 2.409 2.405 2.404 2.475 2.462 2.523 
2.520 2.567 2.597 2.661 2.697 2.606 2.704 
2.853 2.949 2.799 2.910 2.883 2.938 2.953 
3.124 3.164 3.083 3.035 3.158 3.207 3.121 
3.378 3.566 3.500 3.372 3.276 3.133 3.418 
1+9 1+10 1+11 (+12 H13 1+14 1+15 
2.952 2.907 3.055 2.961 3.004 2.889 3.003 
2.978 2.991 3.056 3.000 2.962 3.121 3.028 
3.371 3.287 3.393 3.373 3.394 3.321 3.425 
3.780 3.714 3.606 3.787 3.629 3.544 3.564 
4.514 3.827 4.173 4.150 4.214 4.208 3.919 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
3.021 3.127 3.002 3.000 3.125 3.080 3.087 
3.180 3.143 3.258 3.105 3.298 3.459 3.313 
3.413 3.374 3.427 3.517 3.615 3.445 3.555 
3.746 3.925 3.862 3.769 3.759 4.004 3.924 
4.618 4.686 4.520 4368 4.689 4.000 4.576 
APPENDIX (Cant.) 
A.III: Standard deviation of the ask price after buys 
_. 
9:30-10 1+ I 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 I" 7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0286 0.0338 0.0317 0.0405 0.0321 0.0294 0.1137-1 0.0373 0.0329 0.0348 0.0359 0.0362 0.0319 0.0325 0.0329 
ASq2) 0.0300 0.0346 0.0378 0.0400 0.0333 0.0331 0.11326 0.0368 0.0345 0.0325 0.0327 0.0324 0.0371 0.0319 0.0338 
ASq3) 0.0431 0.0468 0.0466 00467 0.0407 0.0395 0.1I43~ 0.0409 0.0424 0.0389 0.0403 0.0387 0.0423 0.0414 0.0384 
ASq4) 0.0459 0.0530 0.0544 0.0542 0.0507 0.0490 0.1149.1 0.0509 0.0503 0.0468 0.0480 0.0508 0.0444 0.0456 0.0458 
ASq5) 0.0500 0.0612 0.0615 00630 0.0594 0.0575 0.11540 0.0556 0.0574 0.0578 0.0579 0.0575 0.0517 0.0458 0.0523 
.. 
10 -11 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1"7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0195 0.0247 0.0263 0.0247 0.0251 0.0257 0.1)250' 0.0254 0.0224 0.0260 0.0256 0.0251 0.0248 0.0241 0.0236 
ASq2) 0.0257 0.0300 0.0313 0.0302 0.0324 0.0284 0.II30X 0.0290 0.0283 0.0281 0.0287 0.0291 0.0285 0.0278 0.0289 
ASq3) 0.0319 0.0375 0.0369 0.0382 0.0350 0.0364 0.11381 0.0341 0.0368 0.0365 0.0361 0.0344 0.0364 0.0340 0.0332 
ASq4) 0.0370 0.0452 0.0441 0.0468 0.0423 0.0455 0.11412 0.0405 0.0425 0.0418 0.0397 0.0391 0.0381 0.0391 0.0396 
ASq5) 0.0471 0.0606 0.0566 0.0561 0.0555 0.0554 0.11485 0.0511 0.0498 0.0499 0.0505 0.0464 0.0511 0.0432 0.0462 
11 -12 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1 "7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0124 0.0184 0.0202 0.0184 0.0180 0.0208 0.1120(, 0.0191 0.0218 0.0209 0.0195 0.0202 0.0190 0.0240 0.0205 
ASq2) 0.0226 0.0253 0.0239 0.0264 0.0266 0.0248 0.11231 0.0230 0.0222 0.0236 0.0236 0.0221 0.0227 0.0233 0.0237 
ASq3) 0.0282 0.0319 0.0290 0.0286 0.0295 0.0276 0.11300 0.0264 0.0277 0.0274 0.0262 0.0266 0.0267 0.0245 0.0273 
ASq4) 0.0334 0.0395 0.0361 0.0371 0.0385 0.0401 0.11353 0.0328 0.0379 0.0346 0.0370 0.0321 0.0337 0.0309 0.0348 
ASq5) 0.0454 0.0555 0.0451 0.0451 0.0458 0.0592 0.0476 0.0587 0.0496 0.0440 0.0528 0.0478 0.0441 0.0410 0.0526 
12 -13 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1"7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+\3 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0142 0.0167 0.0172 0.0189 0.0188 0.0175 0.0173 0.0194 0.0172 0.0174 0.0168 0.0177 0.0175 0.0183 0.0192 
ASq2) 0.0192 0.0252 0.0199 0.0240 0.0227 0.0216 0.0251 0.0241 0.0214 0.0210 0.0234 0.0234 0.0224 0.0206 0.0197 
ASq3) 0.0219 0.0246 0.0243 0.0262 0.0238 0.0245 0.11255 0.0255 0.0224 0.0241 0.0255 0.0248 0.0245 0.0234 0.0222 
ASq4) 0.0256 0.0315 0.0306 0.0321 0.0259 0.0301 0.11311 0.0262 0.0316 0.0294 0.0266 0.0289 0.0261 0.0235 0.0234 
ASq5) 0.0349 0.0380 0.0345 0.0309 0.0467 0.0394 0.11268 0.0369 0.0241 0.0334 0.0327 0.0464 0.0512 0.0304 0.0346 
13 -14 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 I" 7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0119 0.0163 0.0183 0.0194 0.0165 0.0175 0.11192 0.0188 0.0177 0.0175 0.0188 0.0196 0.0193 0.0191 0.0225 
ASq2) 0.0209 0.0228 0.0236 0.0223 0.0193 0.0226 0.11206 0.0230 0.0234 0.0200 0.0233 0.0207 0.0216 0.0201 0.0206 
ASq3) 0.0212 0.0281 0.0269 0.0264 0.0263 0.0261 0.11252 0.0269 0.0260 0.0265 0.0285 0.0267 0.0273 0.0270 0.0243 
ASq4) 0.0274 0.0357 0.0304 0.0326 0.0319 0.0360 0.<1313 0.0320 0.0328 0.0270 0.0334 0.0306 0.0295 0.0296 0.0342 
ASq5) 0.0351 0.0417 0.0324 0.0352 0.0298 0.0341 0.0496 0.0304 0.0328 0.0329 0.0265 0.0129 0.0233 0.0340 0.0236 
14 -15 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0178 0.0217 0.0249 0.0248 0.0227 0.0248 0.11223 0.0224 0.0241 0.0260 0.0255 0.0235 0.0240 0.0257 0.0273 
ASq2) 0.1219 0.0275 0.0292 0.0746 0.0733 0.0298 0.0268 0.0296 0.0697 0.0740 0.0275 0.0271 0.0293 0.0281 0.0301 
ASq3) 0.1208 0.0335 0.0340 0.0788 0.0793 0.0321 0.0338 0.0328 0.1257 0.0792 0.0329 0.0309 0.0776 0.0319 0.0355 
ASq4) 0.0279 0.0377 0.0355 0.0374 0.0343 0.0320 0.0402 0.0391 0.0378 0.0364 0.0375 0.0350 0.0343 0.0350 0.0374 
ASq5) 0.0390 0.0409 0.0444 0.0395 0.0348 0.0291 0.0364 0.0462 0.0312 0.0434 0.0357 0.0336 0.0322 0.0284 0.0291 
15 -15:30 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0221 0.0310 0.0318 0.0294 0.0307 0.0281 0.(1311 0.0308 0.0336 0.0337 0.0306 0.0333 0.0335 0.0314 0.0310 
ASq2) 0.0280 0.0335 0.0295 0.0327 0.0323 0.0353 0,(1343 0.0321 0.0293 0.0338 0.0321 0.0355 0.0310 0.0309 0.0378 
ASq3) 0.0354 0.0393 0.0377 0.0384 0.0422 0.0403 0.0399 0.0391 0.0410 0.0408 0.0391 0.0393 0.0420 0.0397 0.0449 
ASq4) 0.0401 0.0427 0.0442 0.0443 0.0443 0.0428 0.0464 0.0421 0.0419 0.0441 0.0416 0.0444 0.0452 0.0435 0.0397 
ASq5) 0.0435 0.0453 0.0493 0.0376 0.0439 0.0499 0.0445 0.0473 0.0532 0.0415 0.0462 0.0536 0.0491 0.0506 0.0489 
15:30 -16 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASql) 0.0205 0.0291 0.0320 0.0313 0.0358 0.0376 0.0312 0.0327 0.0304 0.0328 0.0225 0.0345 0.0287 0.0320 0.0252 
ASq2) 0.0282 0.0337 0.0329 0.0335 0.0361 0.0379 0.0307 0.0380 0.0291 0.0339 0.0340 0.0323 0.0333 0.0353 0.0328 
ASq3) 0.0322 0.0368 0.0363 0.0410 0.0385 0.0405 0.0368 0.0404 0.0395 0.0381 0.0356 0.0371 0.0379 0.0375 0.0382 
ASq4) 0.0347 0.0444 0.0396 0.0400 0.0374 0.0403 0.0406 0.0418 0.0410 0.0434 0.0401 0.0430 0.0418 0.0382 0.0426 
ASq5) 0.0422 0.0584 0.0669 0.0552 0.0469 0.0476 0.0582 0.0592 0.0482 0.0507 0.0553 0.0531 0.0445 0.0446 0.0491 
9:30 -10 I" I 1+2 1+3 
ASC(I) 0.1426 0.1718 0.1706 
ASC(2) 0.1481 0.1726 0.1781 
ASC(3) 0.1616 0.1831 0.1853 
ASC(4) 0.2033 0.2022 0.1990 
ASC(5) 0.2552 0.2243 0.2204 
10 -11 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASql) 0.1364 0.1556 0.1626 
ASC(2) 0.1426 0.1647 0.1715 
ASC(3) 0.1698 0.1812 0.1858 
ASC(4) 0.2181 0.2059 0.1999 
ASC(5) 0.2628 0.2178 0.2092 
11 -12 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASC(I) 0.1332 0.1510 0.1578 
ASq2) 0.1404 0.1611 0.1675 
ASC(3) 0.1700 0.1785 0.1792 
ASq4) 0.2243 0.2056 0.1988 
ASC(5) 0.2773 0.2350 0.2181 
12 -13 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASql) 0.1340 0.1484 0.1569 
ASC(2) 0.1407 0.1611 0.1685 
ASq3) 0.1711 0.1760 0.1765 
ASC(4) 0.2212 0.2026 0.1932 
ASq5) 0.2602 0.2195 0.1955 
13 -14 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASC(I) 0.1325 0.1464 0.1528 
ASq2) 0.1397 0.1587 0.1637 
ASC(3) 0.1752 0.1799 0.1789 
ASC(4) 0.2260 0.2045 0.1941 
ASC(5) 0.2657 0.2295 0.2026 
14 -15 t+1 1+2 t+3 
ASC(I) 0.1344 0.1538 0.1633 
ASC(2) 0.1426 0.1642 0.1716 
ASq3) 0.1749 0.1816 0.1850 
ASC(4) 0.2186 0.2025 0.1953 
ASC(5) 0.2686 0.2254 0.2125 
15 -15:30 t+1 1+2 1+3 
ASC(I) 0.1418 0.1648 0.1709 
ASC(2) 0.1424 0.1687 0.1738 
ASC(3) 0.1754 0.1858 0.1867 
ASq4) 0.2137 0.2009 0.1974 
ASC(5) 0.2658 0.2202 0.2096 
15:30-16 1+1 1+2 1+3 
ASC(I) 0.1410 0.1659 0.1704 
ASC(2) 0.1438 0.1657 0.1742 
ASC(3) 0.1755 0.1856 0.1878 
ASC(4) 0.2189 0.2069 0.1983 



















































































































































1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1682 0.1720 0.1732 0.1692 0.1667 0.1714 0.1753 
0.1775 0.1741 0.1785 0.1776 0.1798 0.1803 0.1792 
0.1848 0.1848 0.1871 0.1868 0.1877 0.1888 0.1878 
0.1980 0.2022 0.2013 0.2027 0.2019 0.2018 0.2004 
0.2208 0.2210 0.2231 0.2233 0.2231 0.2190 0.2226 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1709 0.1696 0.1695 0.1697 0.1667 0.1668 0.1685 
0.1732 0.1720 0.1731 0.1728 0.1713 0.1732 0.1737 
0.1826 0.1851 0.1841 0.1825 0.1822 0.1822 0.1818 
0.1923 0.1916 0.1942 0.1937 0.1906 0.1913 0.1902 
0.2017 0.2083 0.2077 0.2151 0.2143 0.2124 0.2051 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1669 0.1677 0.1688 0.1697 0.1726 0.1708 0.1692 
0.1703 0.1720 0.1725 0.1730 0.1733 0.1716 0.1714 
0.1796 0.1792 0.1789 0.1789 0.1794 0.1784 0.1799 
0.1895 0.1853 0.1863 0.1847 0.1889 0.1890 0.1872 
0.2010 0.2078 0.2064 0.2006 0.1991 0.1984 0.1956 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1696 0.1690 0.1723 0.1700 0.1707 0.1702 0.1692 
0.1709 0.1688 0.1741 0.1735 0.1729 0.1721 0.1712 
0.1748 0.1754 0.1772 0.1763 0.1740 0.1736 0.1763 
0.1815 0.1835 0.1826 0.1861 0.1824 0.1808 0.1812 
0.1924 0.1900 0.1861 0.1927 0.1970 0.2011 0.2039 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1636 0.1647 0.1649 0.1637 0.1645 0.1655 0.1646 
0.1722 0.1716 0.1722 0.1728 0.1714 0.1708 0.1730 
0.1762 0.1762 0.1773 0.1775 0.1801 0.1788 0.1775 
0.1848 0.1847 0.1831 0.1871 0.1852 0.1864 0.1849 
0.1997 0.1980 0.1977 0.1903 0.1833 0.1869 0.2024 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1738 0.1759 0.1737 0.1751 0.1771 0.1770 0.1775 
0.1798 0.1815 0.1819 0.1793 0.1785 0.1789 0.1815 
0.1850 0.1865 0.1873 0.1840 0.1877 0.1879 0.1875 
0.1909 0.1904 0.1913 0.1906 0.1891 0.1893 0.1890 
0.2005 0.1919 0.1906 0.1932 0.1928 0.1913 0.1911 
1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
0.1819 0.1808 0.1809 0.1787 0.1815 0.1805 0.1799 
0.1810 0.1797 0.1796 0.1784 0.1803 0.1807 0.1781 
0.1905 0.1917 0.1901 0.1896 0.1898 0.1886 0.1870 
0.1943 0.1941 0.1957 0.1920 0.1933 0.1926 0.1914 
0.2074 0.2003 0.1995 0.2019 0.1973 0.1978 0.1952 
1+9 1+10 t+11 1+12 1+13 t+14 1+15 
0.1785 0.1790 0.1753 0.1791 0.1790 0.1791 0.1822 
0.1792 0.1799 0.1797 0.1846 0.1839 0.1840 0.1843 
0.1916 0.1917 0.1902 0.1910 0.1903 0.1910 0.1889 
0.1970 0.1945 0.1936 0.1931 0.1912 0.1951 0.1997 
0.2131 0.2116 0.2184 0.2054 0.2033 0.2047 0.2121 
APPENDIX (Cont.) 
A.V: Depth quoted at the ask price after buys 
9:30 -10 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1 +-7 1+8 t+9 1+10 1+ 11 1+12 1+13 1+14 t+ 15 
ASC(I) 70.94 78.60 92.06 100.85 110.34 116.05 121.25 117.86 113.53 115.26 120.11 117.42 112.08 122.37 118.39 
ASC(2) 72.11 83.39 93.31 94.50 99.55 107.00 108.01 104.29 103.26 113.53 116.20 112.91 112.86 11 0.39 113.70 
ASC(3) 83.18 98.38 103.19 105.24 105.25 112.98 118.65 121.51 127.96 130.36 136.72 137.89 131.46 132.24 134.59 
ASC(4) 69.96 75.81 83.06 89.35 91.72 90.'10 9.1.18 103.11 105.57 102.09 99.72 99.31 99.98 110.00 109.54 
ASC(5) 79.29 74.30 76.98 88.02 95.27 98.12 91.82 94.03 92.27 95.10 87.71 91.08 91.61 87.34 97.75 
10 -11 1+1 p2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+-7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASC(I) 71.70 88.72 97.19 97.91 103.'15 106.35 110.19 111.56 111.64 113.15 111.13 114.85 112.73 111.14 116.'18 
ASC(2) 84.03 97.86 100.03 104.32 109.76 110.79 114.33 112.77 113.94 115.'10 119.05 116.57 112.65 110.50 111.44 
ASC(3) 78.18 83.16 86.35 91.53 93.87 97.51 %.64 94.53 97.47 98.58 98.93 98.14 100.00 101.09 101.99 
ASC(4) 79.63 80.83 84.51 87.04 91.80 89.13 91.11 91.23 87.84 88.56 91.16 97.41 98.51 96.83 96.60 
ASC(5) 107.00 82.29 89.13 93.12 103.26 99.76 91.90 105.27 101.03 92.71 108.71 117.95 115.42 109.53 104.96 
11 -12 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1 + 7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASC(I) 73.45 86.20 91.57 93.19 96.61 99.81 100.98 102.22 104.86 104.72 103.79 107.65 111.87 110.09 108.10 
ASC(2) 81.11 89.06 92.43 97.10 98.78 100.14 102.59 106.14 107.07 104.'17 102.97 106.85 104.32 107.43 105.06 
ASC(3) 77.18 81.83 84.75 90.03 94.11 101.55 100.87 102.34 101.29 104.19 105.'18 103.77 103.11 106.73 102.40 
ASC(4) 78.81 73.80 79.76 78.94 86.97 83.70 BX.06 91.'14 91.36 89.03 88.15 86.17 90.37 92.51 98.56 
ASC(5) 138.09 111.17 104.75 116.'14 116.03 90.33 BII.55 84.90 98.68 96.25 108.71 118.'16 107.64 97.80 94.03 
12 -13 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASC(I) 71.74 80.03 89.34 94.78 101.56 102.60 1114.43 108.01 109.'19 11 LOO 110.63 116.06 121.68 121.78 122.43 
ASC(2) 87.83 93.77 96.26 102.10 108.63 109.01 112.99 105.85 107.86 113.92 120.71 120.96 123.28 124.05 123.41 
ASC(3) 96.80 102.66 102.52 103.11 103.53 102.14 104.85 104.23 107.09 111.13 113.73 110.'16 112.06 116.01 110.99 
ASC(4) 98.32 101.69 101.44 100.24 101.73 95.12 9~.84 95.56 97.'19 101.81 101.34 104.03 107.43 108.50 113.62 
ASC(5) 205.59 164.69 154.22 126.73 120.74 136.19 IS5.2? 140.71 160.94 158.14 140.82 117.84 103.84 110.84 137.44 
13 -14 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASC(I) 74.06 81.93 90.27 96.91 97.02 101.71 103.(19 99.64 102.08 101.48 105.44 104.36 103.78 101.77 103.85 
ASC(2) 86.27 92.81 100.16 105.13 105.91 110.92 110.72 111.25 118.00 113.59 111.65 114.59 123.22 120.16 122.73 
ASC(3) 81.37 82.66 85.62 86.59 88.38 89.15 SK.74 92.58 93.24 89.14 91.67 92.63 99.07 97.48 98.62 
ASC(4) 96.33 93.97 92.27 95.60 101.49 99.93 91.68 100.53 100.96 104.72 107.89 102.49 102.64 101.78 99.69 
ASC(5) 146.03 144.'12 147.17 172.94 127.28 125.34 119.5~ 95.60 107.19 106.24 142.68 101.71 95.89 93.26 114.02 
t+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1·+7 
_. 
1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 14 -15 1+1 
ASC(I) 72.14 84.29 91.77 'n.30 101.86 103.57 llil.O(, 101.14 107.06 108.59 107.28 109.29 115.60 118.06 118.92 
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ASC(4) 82.56 80.04 77.16 85.29 88.69 91.24 91.0<) 89.'14 85.65 88.18 88.83 90.18 92.31 92.17 88.64 
ASC(5) 143.32 117.11 104.31 106.60 103.72 118.51 116.72 103.06 92.34 91.91 78.90 82.20 92.28 88.13 87.93 
15 -15:30 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 i+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 1+15 
ASC(I) 61.24 77.08 82.54 86.86 88.36 96.69 llil.48 101.99 99.77 98.37 99.11 99.'14 97.90 101.84 101.07 
ASC(2) 77.28 83.97 93.53 93.55 92.56 97.28 97.64 98.55 97.33 96.85 94.11 95.81 95.04 95.16 94.83 
ASC(3) 73.86 85.68 88.80 82.24 88.52 93.95 8R.46 88.31 86.77 92.19 92.08 98.89 99.03 91.26 87.78 
ASC(4) 73.92 77.61 76.25 78.57 80.90 84.56 80.'14 81.40 83.00 85.39 81.16 82.59 83.28 80.11 83.39 
ASC(5) 84.32 79.53 80.84 79.71 86.93 85.77 73.09 72.80 65.54 70.63 73.73 80.45 88.20 81.37 83.97 
15:30 -16 1+1 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 1+8 1+9 1+10 1+11 1+12 1+13 1+14 t+15 
ASC(I) 62.52 75.02 82.48 86.'13 95.43 101.28 99.87 110.07 128.91 118.41 120.75 120.35 106.06 108.24 119.64 
ASC(2) 82.78 91.68 101.14 106.56 115.91 115.34 106.56 105.89 104.70 103.76 110.00 117.06 113.67 118.84 125.57 
ASC(3) 83.32 93.29 97.79 100.25 99.90 97.76 %.73 89.46 92.24 95.'13 90.83 94.15 94.43 98.42 104.94 
ASC(4) 74.11 77.95 80.59 87.03 89.24 94.95 94.47 89.43 81.20 84.35 99.98 100.84 99.44 91.98 88.00 
ASC(5) 137.21 101.10 90.40 97.21 97.38 107.41 114.54 118.82 103.07 110.12 88.28 104.05 106.44 93.70 88.75 
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